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Hiding Databases from Public and Other Users

In my recent presentation on Common SQL Server Security Mistakes, a question was asked about what to do with the public role – from a security standpoint.

My response was that, in the majority of cases, the public role isn’t something that you’ll need to worry about. But, that since the public role does ‘leak’ or ‘disclose’ information about objects and databases on a given server, that can be a problem in a very small minority of environments. I therefore recommended, that in those (typically extreme) edge-cases, that removing the public role would make sense – only that if you do undertake such an endeavor, you should watch out for potential side effects.

In this post I’m going to clarify that answer – and provide some examples.


As a point of clarification, you can’t remove public at all. You can’t remove the public role from your server, nor can you remove it from your databases. Likewise, you can’t remove logins or users from membership in the public role. (Every once in a while you’ll see questions on forums from someone who has MANAGED to do this – but it effectively breaks SQL Server and isn’t supported. Not sure how people manage to do this either – and don’t care, because i’m NOT advocating it.)

Being a member of the public role is a requirement for working with SQL Server.

So, when I mentioned that you might want to REMOVE the public role in some cases, what I actually SHOULD have said was that: in some cases, you might want to remove the VISIBILITY that the public role grants; but, in doing so, just be forewarned that in some cases that MIGHT cause problems with some logins in some very goofy edge cases.


The best way to get a sense for what I’m talking about is to look at some concrete, step-by-step, examples.

For these examples, let’s assume the following:

  • You’ve got a highly sensitive database called Customers.
  • You have OTHER critical databases on the same Server.
  • You have a web application – that connects to the server’s Customer database via a Login called Web_App[1].
  • You also have some logins for employees within your organization – who need to access the server for regular reports or something. We’ll call one of these user Wilson[1].

For these examples, let’s say that you’ve already done due-diligence from a security standpoint – and both the Wilson and the Web_App logins have been mapped as users into the Customers database with minimal permissions – such as being granted db_datareader, db_datawriter and/or the the ability to execute a couple of trusted stored procedures.

Under a scenario like this, if Wilson were to log into SQL Server Management Studio against your server, his membership in the public server role (all logins are made members of the public role at the server level) would grant him a view of all databases, like so:


And, since the Web_App login is also a member of the public server role, if hackers were able to compromise your web app, and gain access to the server (i.e. via SQL Injection), they’d be able to do:


And get the following results:


In other words, they’d be able to see the same things that Wilson (or any other login on your server) would see.

In most cases, this is not an issue. If it is an issue, you’ve got two options for dealing with this.

First, you can remove public’s ability to SEE all databases on the server. To do this, just run the following query:


This operation denies all logins (since all logins are members of the public role) the ability to see databases on the server that they don’t OWN. Which means that users that are mapped as db_owner will still see ‘their’ databases within the Object Explorer or if they query sys.databases. (And since the SysAdmin, or sa, account is automatically granted db_owner in all databases, the SysAdmin account will still see everything.)

But, for logins like Wilson or Web_App which are NOT members of db_owner, what they can see is drastically limited, as per the following screenshot:


As you can see, in this case, Wilson isn’t able to see anything – other than the master and tempdbs. In fact, even though Wilson has permissions in the Customers database, he’s still not able to see the database in the Object Explorer. He is, however, still able to log in, and can execute the same queries against the Customers databases as before. He’s just lost the ability to ‘see’ the VIEW for ANY database.

Likewise, if the Web_App user issues the same query against sys.databases as before, they’re only able to see the following:


In this case, there IS an entry for the Customers database – but that’s just signifying permissions in the database – it doesn’t indicate the ability to peruse the schema of that database. In fact, take a look at the results of the following query in terms of what’s returned (apparently just a bunch of Service Broker objects that apparently didn’t get the memo on ‘lock down’ against public ‘disclosure’):


A Less Aggressive Approach

Denying VIEW DATABASE to public is a pretty heavy-handed approach. It’s an all or nothing proposition.

So, if you try that and it doesn’t work, you can easily ‘undo’ it with the following:


More importantly, you can implement the same safegaurds at a much more granular level – meaning that if you want to limit the information disclosed should hackers manage to compromise your web application (through SQL Injection or something else), you can just use the following:


And this will then let Wilson and all other logins on the system continue as before – but the Web_App login will be restricted in terms of what schema it can see or view.

TIP: If you end up locking down an individual user account (or role) so that it can’t see all databases in the Object Explorer, do your users a favor and make sure that the default database specified in their login is the database that they can use. Otherwise they’ll have to do a USE databaseNameHere query just to get started with things – as they can no longer right-click on the database in question from the Object Explorer and select the New Query option.


Best Practices

Ultimately, hiding databases from members of the public role is something you really don’t need to worry about in most environments. Though there’s no harm in restricting application logins or other publicly-facing accounts in this way. In fact, it’s a best practice to make sure that any applications have their logins RESTRICTED with DENY VIEW ANY DATABASE TO <appLoginNameHere> once the app is up and running. It’s a simple, added, extra precaution that helps contribute to defense-in-depth by mitigating any potential issues with information disclosure.

Of course, if you’re working in an environment where SQL Injection is a possibility (and sadly, there are plenty of apps out there where SQL injection IS a possibility, but the app can’t be immediately taken offline and fixed like it should be), then using this approach can be part of a mitigation strategy. It is not, however, a sufficient protection. (All it can do, when combined with granting applications least-privilege access to ONLY the resources they need, is mitigate the scope of damage hackers can/will inflict once they compromise your application.)

And, in highly sensitive environments where employees need to be denied access to even knowing about the existence of certain databases, using the approaches outlined here can be an easy way to accomplish those goals. I’d just recommend going with the least heavy-handed approach possible (by blocking individual logins instead of the public role) when feasible.

Otherwise, just be aware that in some edge-cases if you DENY VIEW ANY DATABASE to some users, they’ll actually encounter full-blown login problems in some goofy cases (I swear I’ve seen some with SQL Server Reporting Services databases) where SSMS won’t like this restriction. Though, problems with this should be ‘once in a blue moon’ problems – which is further reduced by the fact that implementing the suggestions outlined here really don’t apply to most environments. 

[1] I’m using SQL Server Authentication in these examples (and with STRONG (i.e. LONG) passwords this is secure enough – but in really highly-sensitive environments, you’re better off using trusted security).

Common SQL Server Security Mistakes

In my Presentation: Common SQL Server Security Mistakes (link), I mentioned a number of different resources for additional learning.

Here they are (and I may update these over time).


Core SQL Server Security / Background
43% of companies surveyed in 2009 had lost data to hackers


The Seven Steps to Successful SQL Server Auditing


David Penton’s Not-so Dynamic Sql (SQL Injection)

Least Privilege

SQL Server 2005 Security Best Practices - Operation and Administrative Tasks

Process Monitor (great for troubleshooting when de-privileging service accounts)

SQL Server Credentials and Proxies

I also have a script available which you can use to create an sp_execproc database role which is a great option for forcing applications to only use sprocs for additional security/lockdown. Eventually I’ll provide a blog post on how to use that (and how to address some of the limitations). But if you’d like that script, just ping me at mike at overachiever.net.